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RECENT CASES
HUSBAND AND WIFE-DAMAGES-WIFE'S RGTrr To DAMAGES FOR Loss
OF CONSORTIUM Dui TO NEGLImENT INJURY OF HUSBAND.-The plaintiff's

husband was injured when his vehicle was struck at a railroad crossing.
The defendant railroad had been found negligent in a previous action,1
and bad been held liable to the husband for his injuries. The wife,
suing for loss of consortium, urged the court to reconsider its previous
stand denying the wife a cause of action growing out of the injury
negligently inflicted upon her husband, 2 on the ground that other
jurisdictions have recently allowed such an action. 3 Held: Judgment
for defendant affirmed. "Since there is a diversity of opinion among
the courts in other jurisdictions and this court... having regard for
stare decisis, we affirm the judgment." Baird v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T.

Pac. R.R., 368 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Ky. 1963).
Consortium is defined as the conjugal fellowship of husband and
wife. 4 The concept of a cause of action for the loss of this fellowship

originated during a period of history when the wife had few legal
privileges. She could neither sue nor be sued. She could not own
property as she was property of her husband. The action for
consortium was based on this proprietary interest which husbands had
in their wives. Interference with consortium was an interference with

the natural use of property and constituted actionable trespass upon
that property right.5 The wife had no corresponding property interest
in the husband, and therefore she was given no right of action for an
interference with her consortium. 6
After the passage of the Married Woman's Acts, 7 the courts were
forced to consider whether a wife should be allowed a cause of action
for the loss of, or interference with, her consortium. Prior to 1950,
the courts almost uniformly held such a right did exist in case of
1 Baird v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T. Pac. Ry., 315 F.2d 717 (6th Cir. 1963).
2
Cravens v. Louisville & N. Ry., 195 Ky. 257, 242 S.W. 628 (1922); LaEase
v. Cincinnati,
N. & C. Ry., 249 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1952).
3
Dini V. Naiditch, 20 InI. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1963); Montgomery v.
Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227 (1960); Brown v. Ga.-Tenn. Coaches
Inc., 88 Ga. App. 519, 77 S.E.2d 24 (1953); Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272, 78
N.W.2d 480 (1956); Missouri P. Transportation Co. v. Miller, 227 Ark. 351, 299
S.W.2d 41 (1957); Hitaffer v. Argonne Co. 87 App. D.C. 57, 183 F.2d 811,
cert. denied 340 U.S. 852 (1950).
4 Black, Law Dictionary 382 (4th ed. 1951); In Dini v. Naiditch, supra note
3, at 891, the court said, 'Consortium includes in addition to material sources,
elements of companionship, felicity, and sexual intercourse, all welded into a
conceptual unity.'
GHolbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Consortium, 22 Mich. L. Rev. 1
(1923).
0,8 Holsworth, A History of English Law 427 (2d ed. 1937); 1 Blackstone,
Commentaries
442.
7
See, e.g., Ky. Acts ch. 52 §§ 505, 506 (1894), now KRS 404.010 (1954).

KETUCKY LAw JouRNAL

[Vol. 52,

intentional interference, 8 but that no such right existed in cases of
negligent interference.0 Reasons advanced for denying recovery for
loss of, or interference with, a wife's consortium in negligence cases
were: (1) possibility of double recovery since a husband can recover
in his own action for his diminished ability to support his family; (2)
unforeseeabiity and remoteness of the injury; and (3) the theory
that a wife has no right corresponding to a husband's right to her
services.'

o

Hitaffer v. Argonne,'. a 1950 federal court decision, made a complete departure from the prevailing rule and allowed a wife to recover
for the loss of the consortium of her husband as a result of his
negligent injury. 12 The court, after an extensive review of the prior
litigation on the subject, found that consortium consisted of more
than just material services,' 3 and found love, affection, and sexual
relations to be predominant elements, the loss of which were a direct
damage to a wife. Refusing to be bound by stare decisis, the court
found that the reasons advanced for denying a wife a cause of action
for negligent interference with her right to consortium were insufficient. 14
The legal logic of the Hitaffer case is irrefutable. It reflects the
same thinking and reaches the same conclusion as the major treatises
on the subject.'5 The effect of the case has been to spearhead a trend
toward allowing the wife equal recovery with the husband for loss of
8
See, e.g., Clark v. Hill, 69 Mo. App. 541 (1897); Turner v. Heavrin, 182
Ky. 65, 206 S.W. 23 (1918).
9 Feueff v. New York Cent. & H. f.Ry., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N.E. 436, (1909);
Stout v. Kansas City Terminal R.R., 172 Mo. App. 113, 157 S.W. 1019 (1913);
Cravens v. Louisville & N. R.R., 195 Ky. 257, 242 S.W. 628 (1922).
10 Baird v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T. Pac. R.R., 368 S.W.2d 172, 173 (Ky. 1963).
1187 App. D.C. 57, 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied 340 U.S.
852 (1950).
12 The Hitaffer case has been overruled in part by Smither & Co. v. Coles,
100 U.S. App. D.C. 68, 242 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1957), where the court said
that a wife of an employee who received full benefits under a workmen's compensation statute was barred from recovering from the employer for loss of
consortium in view of the statute.
18 The idea that consortium is made primarily of material services and that
this loss is compensated for in the husband's separate action is one advanced by
many courts in denying the wife a cause of action. Those courts fear that to
allow the wife's action would result in double recovery. See, e.g., Marri v. Stamford St.
Ry., 84 Conn. 9, 78 Atl. 582 (1911).
14 Among the reasons advanced for denying recovery, other than double
recovery and remoteness of injury are: if a cause of action is to be allowed the
wife, it must come from the legislature. Ash v. 5.5. Mullon Inc., 43 Wash. 2d
345, 261 P.2d 118 (1953); no right of recovery in wife for loss of sentimental
services, Stout v. Kansas City Terminal Ry., 172 Mo. App. 113, 157 S.W. 1019
(1913).
15Prosser, Torts 704 (2d ed. 1955); 1 Harper & James, Torts 635 (1st ed.
1956); Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 1378 (1952).
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consortium. Eleven state courts16 and several federal district courts
have considered the problem since 1950, and basing their verdicts
on the reasoning of the Hitaffer case, have overruled contrary
decisions and allowed the wife a cause of action. During 7this same
period, seventeen states refused to follow the Hitaffer case.'
The principal case is the second time the question of a wife's right
to recover for the negligent interference with her right to consortium
has been before the Kentucky court since the Hitaffer decision. In
1952, in LaEase v. Cincinnati,N. & C. Ry.,18 the court, while acknowledging the Hitaffer decision, felt bound by stare decisis and denied
recovery without any discussion of the actual problem involved. In
the principal case, the court made a complete examination of the
problem involved and the progress of the law on the subject, taking
special note of the progress since 1950 and the Hitaffer case. The
court in its closing paragraph summed up its findings:
In the present age the distinction between the right of a wife and
of a husband to maintain the action is at odds with reason. The same
may be said as to the inconsistency inherent in recognizing a wife has a
cause of action for the impairment of consortium where her husband's
injury was the result of an intentional or malicious wrong, but not
where it is the result of negligence. Nevertheless, since there is a
diversity of opinion among the courts in other jurisdictions and this
court has heretofore expressly declined to depart from its earlier decision,
having regard for the doctrine of stare decisis, we affirm the judgment.19

It is felt that the court placed undue weight on the doctrine of
stare decisis 20 and it is urged that at its next opportunity the court
bestow upon the wife this right of action for the negligent interference with her consortium.
Thomas C. Greene

CONTRACrS-CONSiDERATION-EFFECr OF SUBSEQUENT COMPROMISE FOR

MomE MoNEY.-The defendant advertised for subcontractor bids on
various phases of a large construction project. The plaintiff, a subcontractor, submitted a bid to the defendant, and was subsequently
advised that its figure would be used in defendant's bid. The de16

Baird v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T. Pac. R.R., supra note 10, at 174.
Ibid.
249 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1952).
2100 Baird v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T. Pac. R.R., supra note 10, at 174.
"It is as much the duty of this court to restore a right which has been
erroneously withheld by judicial opinion as it is to recognize it properly in the
first instance. We do indeed have a 'charge to keep', but that is not a charge to
perpetuate error.... " Felton Judge, in Brown v. Ga.-Tenn. Coaches, Inc.,
88 Ga. App. 519, 527; 77 S.E.2a 24, 82 (1953).
17
18

